



The Army must remain trained and ready to deter war, deploy and commit forces rapidly to protect U.S. interests, and, if necessary, fight and win. Training includes the full range of individual training for military and civilian personnel and unit/collective training. It gives soldiers, leaders, and units the knowledge and skills to accomplish their missions successfully.

- Army schools develop soldiers and leaders as they progress through their careers.
- Training at home station prepares units to perform as combined arms teams or joint/ combined arms and services teams.
- Deployments for training, such as rotations at the Combat Training Centers and Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises, allow units to practice the integration of all battlefield operating systems, including joint systems.
- Leadership development training provides advancement opportunities for officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians.

Goals, Objectives, and Performance Measures

Goal: *Units trained for rapid deployment and decisive victory.* The goal of unit training is a combat-ready force that can mobilize, deploy, fight, and win. The Army must ensure that units are ready to respond rapidly and effectively, whether the mission is to promote peace or to win war.

Objective: *Provide individually trained soldiers for America's Army*

Measure: Accomplishment of Initial Entry Training Entry Training (which includes Basic,

TRAINING

Station Unit, and Officer Basic Training) is the introductory training given to all military personnel upon entry into the Army.

Results: The Army produced trained soldiers and officers from the accession input to meet force structure requirements of the National Military Strategy. Soldiers were trained in basic combat skills and were disciplined, motivated, and prepared for follow-on training.

Measure: Accomplishment of MOS qualification training Military Operational Specialty (MOS) training provides soldiers with the specific individual skills necessary in their areas of specialty.

Results: MOS qualification training produced soldiers who are fully MOS qualified and immediately available for assignment to units around the world. Soldiers were trained in specific skills to meet the requirements of positions in the field.

Training ensures that soldiers, leaders, and units are prepared to fight and win. Well-trained and-led, quality soldiers have proven capable of adapting to any situation, against any opponent, anywhere in the world.

Objective: *Sustain unit training.*

Measure: Accomplishment of training at Combat Training Centers (CTCs)

Results:

- National Training Center (NTC): Twelve two-battalion task force-size brigade rotations (11 AC/1 NG) were scheduled for FY 1996. All 12 rotations were conducted at the NTC.
- Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC): Ten three-battalion task force-size brigade rotations were scheduled by FY 1996. All 10 rotations were conducted at the JRTC.
- Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC): Five three-battalion task force-size rotations were scheduled for FY 1996. All five rotations were conducted at the CMTC.
- Battle Command Training Program (BCTP): Trained 2 Corps Warfighter Exercise (WFX) equivalents, 7 division WFX equivalents, 12 Reserve Component (RC) Brigade Battle Command and Battle Staff Training (BCBST) exercises, and 12 Operations Group Delta Joint Task Force exercises.

Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) is a framework for estimating the funds necessary for fuel, spare parts, and other recurring costs of home station operations, training, and maintenance. OPTEMPO requirements are based on unit-specific events in the Battalion Level Training Model. OPTEMPO does not equal readiness. The Army is working to develop an improved system of measurement to define readiness with more rigor and provide a framework to improve the linkage between resources and readiness.

Measure: OPTEMPO-Combat vehicle mileage execution (selected systems). Ground OPTEMPO is programmed to support training readiness at the C1-C2 level, in the Active Component. In Reserve Components, it is programmed at the C1-C3 level based on unit priority. The ground OPTEMPO requirements are generated using the Battalion Level Training Model (BLTM) for both active and reserve component units. Funds are provided to the Major Army Commands for distribution to individual units.

Results: Overall execution for all three systems combined was 107 percent of programmed miles. This is up 16 percent from FY 1995 execution of 91 percent.

FY 1996 Combat Vehicle Mileage Execution

	FY 96	FY 96	FY 95	Percent
System	Prog Mileage	Actual Mileage	Actual Mileage	Change FY95-96
M1A1	800	642	629	+ 1%
M2	934	1,277	1,013	+27%
M3	1,309	1,517	979	+41%

Measure: OPTEMPO-Flying hour execution The FY 1996 total flying hour program was 1,110,242 hours in the President's budget.

Results: FY 1996 execution of 1,035,117 hours was 94.2 percent of the final adjusted program of 1,098,543 hours, reflecting the impact of overall FY 1996 funding shortfalls and downsizing of force structure. This compares with FY 1995 execution of 1,152,519 hours (90 percent), FY 1994 execution of 1,232,640 hours (90.3percent), and FY 1993 execution of 1,371,670 hours (97.6 percent).

The active Army flying hour program assumes one crew per aircraft. The cumulative executed flying hours average for FY 1996 was 14.3 hours per crew per month, compared to 13.8 in FY 1995, 13.5 in FY 1994, and 13.3 in FY 1993.

Active Component Flying Hours

FY 96- Total Flying Hours	336916
FY 96 - Aircraft	1966
FY 96 Average Hours/Crew/Month	14.3
FY 95 - Average Hours/Crew/Month	13.8
FY 94 - Average Hours/Crew/Month	13.5
FY 93 - Average Hours/Crew/Month	13.3

Operational Readiness. Total force readiness is more than just the unit training funds in the OPTEMPO accounts. The Army is working to revise its resource programming approach to

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reflect more accurately and capture its actual training environment. The overall initiative, called Operational Readiness, focuses on the broader needs and requirements of the force projection Army. Operational Readiness will incorporate training ranges; training areas; maintenance facilities; training aids, devices, simulations, and simulators (TADSS); training ammunition; and force projection platforms. It will establish a much stronger link between readiness reporting and program execution.



The Army's highest priority is to maintain readiness. America's ability to respond rapidly to crises worldwide requires a trained and ready Army. High-quality people; tough, realistic, mission-focused training; and competent leaders ensure that the Army is a full-spectrum force capable of decisive victory.



MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT

Mobilization is the process by which the Army is brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. It includes activating reserve components and assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.

Deployment is the process by which military forces, active and reserve, together with sustainment equipment and supplies, are moved to the area of operation in response to a crisis, war, or natural disaster. Mobilization and deployment capabilities are essential to readiness planning under the evolving National Military Strategy. The National Military Strategy seeks to prevent, deter, and when necessary defeat threats to our vital interests. To do this, the Army balances its overseas presence with the capability to project powerful contingency forces anywhere in the world within 24 hours of notification.

The credibility of the new strategy depends on the ability to rapidly deploy an appropriate military force that is capable of decisive victory and that is versatile, lethal, expandable, and sustainable. Following the Persian Gulf War, Congress directed the Department of Defense to determine its strategic mobility requirements. The resulting Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review (MRS-BUR), which identified required investments in sealift, airlift, prepositioning of equipment, and transportation infrastructure, is the centerpiece of national power projection capability.

The Army's implementation of the MRS-BUR is the Army Strategic Mobility Plan (ASMP), which is based on the capability to deploy a five-division contingency force, with its associated support structure, anywhere in the world in 75 days. The Army can project and sustain an armored or a mechanized division anywhere in the world in 30 days. Additionally, the Army can project and sustain an Air Assault, Airborne, or Light division anywhere in 12 days. The Army has the capability to project and sustain a heavy brigade of two Armored battalions and two Mechanized battalions anywhere

in the world in 15 days. This capability has been demonstrated three times in the last 3 years in Southwest Asia.

Goals, Objectives, and Performance Measures

For the Army to provide a total force, immediately deployable, trained and ready to fight, and capable of a decisive victory, it must be able to: order, deploy, and sustain sufficiently manned, equipped, and trained forces to support military operations anywhere in the world; deploy/redeploy active component units; alert, mobilize, and deploy required reserve component units and individuals; and redeploy and demobilize them as directed.

Key capabilities include the following:

- overall ability to achieve deployment closure objectives as set forth in the ASMP;
- augmentation of active component units with reserve component personnel at mandated readiness levels, within minimum possible time;
- support of day-to-day Army operations with reserve component volunteers on temporary tour of active duty when mobilization authority is not available; and
- worldwide operational/military support to humanitarian, disaster relief, and other directed operations.

Strategic Mobility

Goal: *Overall capability to achieve deployment closure objectives as set forth in the Army Strategic Mobility Plan (ASMP).*

Achievement of objectives is expressed in terms of days elapsed since notification of deployment

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("C+..days") versus the closure objectives set forth in operations plans and in accordance with standards in the ASMP. Closure is achieved when unit equipment, personnel, and supply/logistical support are joined together to form a fighting force in the objective area.

Current targets in the ASMP are as follows:

- Light or Airborne Brigade C+4.
- Heavy Brigade to Prepositioned Eqmt Army War Reserves (AWR-5,-4,-2) C+6.
- Light or Airborne Division C+12.
- Heavy Brigade to Army Prepositioned Eqmt Afloat C+15.
- Two Heavy Divisions with Corps Support C+30.
- Two Divisions and Corps Support C+75.

These standards are applied and tested consistently in exercises and actual operations. Actual deployment/redeployment periods may vary, depending on the contingency, circumstances, and political requirements.

Measure: Strategic airlift capability Percent of million ton-miles per day strategic airlift capability achieved (reported by the Air Force).

Results: Through FY 1996, 27 C-17 aircraft have been delivered to the Air Force; the program completion projection is FY 2004.

Measure: Strategic sealift capability Percentage of required strategic sealift capability achieved (reported by the Navy and the Maritime Administration).

Result: Strategic sealift initiatives include procurement of Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships and upgrade of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) fleet. Through FY 1996, the first two conversion LMSRs have been delivered to the Navy. Contracts or options to build have been let for 15 of the remaining 17 LMSRs. The Navy has budgeted the last two LMSRs for FY 1998. A total of 19 LMSRs are programmed to be converted or built through FY 2001, 8 of which will become a part of the prepositioned afloat fleet. The MRS recommended a total of 36 Roll-on/Roll-off ships be maintained in the RRF. The Maritime Administration currently has 31. No funding is programmed for the remaining five.

Although the MRS-BUR recommended a total of 36 Roll-on/Roll-off ships be maintained in the RRF, the FY 1997 President's budget did not support acquisition of the five remaining ROROs needed to meet the recommendation. The U.S. Transportation Command is preparing a strategy to mitigate this strategic sealift shipping shortfall.

Measure: Availability of afloat prepositioned equipment Required prepositioned afloat square footage achieved.

Results: The Army did not add any additional ships to its prepositioned afloat program in 1996. In February 1997, the USNS Gordon will be the first LMSR to receive it's pre-positioned afloat Army War Reserve cargo. These additional ships provide approximately 38 days of supply for units arriving in theater before establishment of sea lines of communication.

Army pre-positioned ships afloat now total 14, and the Army has moved much closer to meeting the MRS requirements.

Mobilization and Deployment of Reserve Components

Goal: *Accession of reserve components into the active component within mobilization standards.*

Accession is achieved in five phases, as set forth in the Army Mobilization Operation Planning and Execution System (AMOPES).

Objectives: *Accession objectives* are shown in the table below. Objectives for individuals and small units were validated during mobilization exercises.

Measure: Reserve component accessions into the active component in accordance with mobilization objectives Army Reserve units are used extensively to augment and supplement active component units in combat support and combat service support.

Results: In May 1996, there were 199 USAR units (1,233 soldiers) mobilized in support of Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti). Mobilized personnel

were from Aviation, Military Police, Engineer, Postal, Transportation, and Special Operations-Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, making up 58 percent of all mobilized reserve components.

At the end of FY 1996, the USAR was supporting Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE) with 139 units (5,682 soldiers). On 30 September, 74 percent of all reserve component units in support of OJE were USAR forces. The USAR provides all the reserve component requirements for Special Operations, Medical, Postal, Finance, Mobilization support, Logistics augmentation, and firefighters. With downsizing of the active component, the requirements for reserve component personnel with special skill (language, computer hardware/software, special operations, transportation, and logistics) have greatly increased.

Downsizing is just another one of the inevitable, omnipresent changes in life. Downsizing is not a survival strategy...but is part of the process.

*Honorable Helen T. McCoy
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Financial Management and Comptroller)*

Mobilization Objectives-Reserve Components Accessions into the Active Component

Entity	Premobilization Alert	Home Station	Mobilization Station	Deployability Date
Individual	M to M+5		M+6 to M+21	M+22
Small Combat Service Support Unit	M-5 to M	M to M+3	M+4 to M+14	M+15
Large Combat Support/ Combat Service Support Unit	M-7 to M	M to M+3	M+4 to M+30	M+31
Combat Brigade	M-7 to M	M to M+3	M+4 to M+90	M+91



SUSTAINING THE FORCE

Introduction

Sustaining the force involves providing all the support necessary to conduct sustained combat operations anywhere in the world at a moment's notice. All levels of activity fall under the sustaining umbrella, from providing soldiers in the field what they need, when, where, and in the condition and quantity required, to providing a home to the force with facilities to work and train that can serve as a platform from which to respond quickly to threats to our Nation's peace and security.

The primary components of sustaining the force are **logistics** and **installation management**.

Core logistical functions are supply, maintenance, transportation, soldier support, and security assistance.

The key installation management functions addressed in this report are facilities, environmental stewardship, and quality of life for soldiers and their families.

Information management is a critical support function that takes place throughout the Army in strategic, theater/tactical, and sustaining base environments.

Sustaining the force is receiving increasing attention as we rely more on troops to deploy rapidly from installations in the United States. Army installations are changing in support of this new military strategy. As the force is downsized, management of this crucial resource becomes even more important.



Combat sustainability is the ability to maintain the required intensity and duration of combat operations to achieve planned objectives. It represents the balanced capability of logistics and combat support over time, and includes force structure, pre-positioned and war reserve materials, prescribed loads and operating stocks, and the wholesale sustaining and industrial base, which in their totality constitute the Army's ability to project and reconstitute.

Goals, Objectives, and Performance Measures

Goals: The overarching goal of the logistics mission is **sustainability of all military operations**. Supporting goals include:

- *Develop logistics doctrine, procedures, and equipment to support future integrated sustainment.*
- *Support and sustain current Army war-fighting capacity and peacetime readiness.*
- *Improve logistics response time to a conflict or crisis.*

Objectives: The following logistics objectives have been identified, but appropriate performance measures have not been fully developed:

- Develop a total distribution capability with asset visibility from source to foxhole.
- Improve industrial preparedness to meet transition and wartime production requirements.
- Maintain equipment at organizational-level standards. Increase combat service support effectiveness in all environments.

LOGISTICS

- Increase survivability of logistics assets by improving their positioning and protection.
- Support security assistance programs to meet the equipment and sustainment needs of supported nations.
- Identify materiel excess to Army requirements and plan to make this equipment available for security assistance opportunities.

Objectives supported by measures follow:

Objective: *Support depot maintenance programs to improve readiness of Army equipment*

Measure: Depot maintenance backlog

This measure identifies shortfalls in the funding necessary to support depot repair and overhaul of major end items and their embedded software. It serves as an indicator of the projected availability of reconditioned and overhauled weapons systems and equipment necessary to support Army redistribution and modernization efforts.

**Maintenance Requirements (\$M)
Percent of Requirements Funded**


FY 94	\$1.272	56%
FY 95	\$1.278	78%
FY 96	\$ 0.959	80%
FY 97	\$1.095	77%

Objective: *Improve the Army's ability to project decisive land combat power*

Measure: Readiness status of major weapons systems Total system availability days (active component), divided by total possible days, for each of the Army's 16 major weapons systems. Indicates trends for each weapons system. Goals are 90 percent for nonaircraft and 75 percent for all aircraft except the UH-60, for which the goal is 80 percent.

Results: The average monthly number of systems achieving readiness goals was 14.

Readiness Status of Major Weapons Systems



Measure: Fully mission-capable (FMC) status of weapon systems

Total system availability (active component) for all systems, including the 16 major weapons systems.

FMC Status of Weapons Systems

Systems	3Qtr FY95	4Qtr FY95	1Qtr FY96	2Qtr FY96	3Qtr FY96
FMC	92	91	90	93	94
Not FMC	65	65	69	53	55

Measure: FMC status of separate line items Total system availability (active component) for all separate line items, including the systems noted above.

FMC Status of Separate Line Items

Line Items	3Qtr FY 95	4Qtr FY 95	1 Qtr FY 96	2Qtr FY 96	3Qtr FY 96
FMC	284	327	324	323	344
Not FMC	108	110	123	123	99

Objective: *Support supply operation programs at a level that will provide timely logistical support to field commands.*

Measure: Order ship time (OST) Total number of days elapsed from the date Authorized Stockage Level (ASL) items are requested until received, divided by the total number of requests. Standards vary according to transportation mode and geographic destination. OST is an indicator of whether sufficient supplies are on hand or available within the supply system to support readiness.

CY 96 Monthly Average Order Ship Time-Surface Transportation

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Europe	63	65.9	73.9	64.1	58.7	69.1	57.1	59.9	53.6	57.1	58.8	61.5
Korea	65.4	59.3	64.8	63.9	51	58.2	60.8	64.8	57.4	70.0	61.3	53.4

Goals: Europe-45 days; Korea-59 days

CY 96 Monthly Average Order Ship Time-Air Transportation

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Europe	29.6	28.3	26.8	24.8	20.9	19	21.1	26.9	19.2	23.1	23.7	27.4
Korea	29	24.9	25.4	23.8	26.1	18	23.6	20.3	23	18.3	19	21.4

Goals: Europe-23 days; Korea-28 days

RETROEUR PROGRAM

Redistribute Equipment, Ammunition, and Other Materiel Throughout America's Army

With the continued drawdown of forces in Europe, the Army was challenged to retrograde significant amounts of materiel to sites in the United States. Through aggressive and judicious internal management, the Army brought back 6,500 tons of ammunition, 537 vehicles, and 152 containers of Class II (organizational clothing and individual

equipment) and Class VII (major end items) materiel during FY 1996, and inducted for repair 1,310 vehicles. Although there are immediate costs associated with such an effort, there will be ultimate cost savings as the Army concludes the closeout of materiel storage sites and less money is needed to maintain materiel in Europe.

RETROEUR Program

	FY 96 Goals	FY 96 Actual	Percent of Goal
Retrograde			
Ammunition	14,000 Short Tons	6,500 Short Tons	47%
Vehicles	600	537	90%
Containers (Class II/Class VII Non-rolling stock)	200	152	76%
Vehicles in Repair Program	1,750	1,310	74%


DATA AS OF THE END OF 3RD QUARTER 1996

Security Assistance (Foreign Military Sales)

The Security Assistance Program is an integral element of U.S. National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. The program enhances U.S. foreign and defense policies, promotes the U.S. economy, and supports the defense industrial base. Through security assistance, the U.S. strengthens regional and world stability, and lessens the likelihood of U.S. military involvement. A primary program objective is to assist friends and allies in sustaining the military capability to defend themselves from aggression.

The Army is involved in the Security Assistance Program through its foreign military sales. The accompanying chart illustrates the trends in new foreign military sales contracts signed from FY 1991 through FY 1996.

Army Foreign Military Sales



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